In 2000, Boneh-Durfee extended the bound for low private exponent from 0.25 (provided by wiener) to 0.292 with public exponent size is same as modulus size. They have used powerful lattice reduction algorithm (LLL) with coppersmith's theory of polynomials. In this paper we generalize their attack to arbitrary public exponent.
INTRODUCTION
Lattice is a discrete subset of . It has found many applications in various fields like the geometry of numbers, integer relations and Diophantine approximations and notably in cryptology. The main problem in lattices is the lattice reduction deals with finding the good representation of a lattice. For thi good representations many versions exist, but the one given by Lenstra-Lenstra-Lovasz is a famous one, because the polynomial time algorithm exists for this version, called LLL algorithm. The algorithm not only solves good representation for the lattice, It also solves the problem called shortest vector problem (SVP) in some extent. In section II, we state the algorithm and its complexity issues. In section III, we provide some inequalities used in this paper for RSA cryptosystem with balanced primes. In section IV, we state the attack and given the justification, which is a generalization of Boneh-Durfee attack .
TERMINOLOGY 2.1 Lattices
A lattice is a discrete subgroup of . Equivalently, given linearly independent vectors , the set , is a lattice. The are called basis vectors of and is called a lattice basis for Thus, the lattice generated by a basis is the set of all integer linear combinations of the basis vectors in
The determinant of a lattice, denoted by is the square root of the gramian determinant , which is independent of particular choice of basis. A general treatment of this topic see [1] .
Lattice reduction:
Lattice reduction is a problem of finding the basis of vectors which are short in terms of norm. There are numerous algorithms exists in the literature, but we use LLL algorithm here. Because there is a polynomial time algorithm exists and vectors are near orthogonal and the first vector solves the approximate SVP problem.
LLL reduced
The following LLL reduced version given by Lenstra, Lenstra, Lovasz [1] , [2] , [3] . LLL reduced: A basis of a lattice is said to be Lovasz-reduced or LLL-reduced if for for where the and are defined by the Gram-Schimdt orthogonalization process acting on the . Above in place of ¾ one can replace any quantity
LLL Algorithm
The Lenstra -Lenstra -Lov´asz (LLL) algorithm [ 
RSA cryptosystem with balanced primes:
RSA cryptosystem [4] is well known cryptosystem and using widely for encryption and signature purposes. In the literature, so many versions exist but in this paper, we consider only balanced primes, which mean that the two RSA primes are roughly the same size. In particular we have , or equivalently, we assume that . It follows that when the RSA primes are balanced, Euler's totient function satisfies .
Resultant of two bivariate polynomials:
The resultant of two polynomials and with respect to the variable , is defined as the determinant of Sylvester matrix of and when considered as polynomials in the single indeterminate
The resultant is non-zero if and only if the two polynomials are algebraically independent. When the polynomials are algebraically independent, the resultant yields a new polynomial such that if is a root of both and then
Assumption:
We assume that the two polynomials return by LLL algorithm are algebraically independent. There is no theoretical proof for this one, but in practice most of the times achieved.
Howgrave-Graham Result for Bivariate Integer Polynomials:
Let be a polynomial in 2 variables with at most w monomials and let m be a positive integer. Suppose in addition that 1) h( where and , and 2) , Then holds over the integers. Here we state the attack and we follow the ideas of BonehDurfee [8] . 
THE GENERALIZED ATTACK OF

Fig1. Boneh and durfee lattice for and
The empty places are filled with zeros. The determinant of is simply the product of its diagonal elements, the volume of is = * .
Computing an LLL-reduced basis for the lattice , the two smallest reduced basis vectors corresponding to two linearly independent polynomials and satisfying
. can be computed and used to factor the modulus. Since all computations can be done in time polynomial in , the result follows. Observe that whenever , the above condition reduces that , which is Boneh-Durfee initial result. They have improved this bound by using geometric progressive matrices. We use the same technique here to improve the above condition to get optimal result. The motivation for the improvement is the observation that some basis vectors in contribute more to volume to the lattice than others. That is, the diagonal elements of some rows are much larger than others. If some of the basis vectors with diagonal elements exceeding re removed from the basis matrix, then the volume of the resulting lattice will be decreased and the bounds on in the final condition will increase. But the resulting lattice is no more full rank lattice, Boneh-Durfee used special class of matrices to compute volume of the lattice called geometrical progressive matrices. Now we will state their attack, generalized for arbitrary public exponent.
IMPROVING THE BOUND
One can improve the above bound by using geometrical progressive matrices as Boneh did in his paper [8] .
Attack:
For every , there exists an such that for every the following holds: Let be an RSA modulus with balanced primes, let be a valid public exponent and let be its corresponding private exponent defined modulo Given , if the private exponent satisfies , then the modulus can be factored in time polynomial in
Justification:
Here also we construct the basis matrix for some fixed and using the same above bounds. Construct a new basis matrix by removing every basis vector that corresponds to a -shift polynomial with diagonal element greater than Let be a basis generated by the new basis matrix. Now compute LLL-reduced basis for , we can find again two linearly independent polynomials bounded by , where is the dimension of the lattice If these polynomials satisfy the Howgrave-Graham's bound , then we can get our desired result. From the two upper bounds above, we can derive (1) If this condition is satisfied and if the two polynomials obtained are also algebraically independent then we can efficiently solve for and factor the modulus. To derive the general condition, construct the matrix of blocks as , where is the lower triangular sub matrix of of order corresponding to the -shift polynomials, is the sub mtrix corresponding to the first columns of the shift polynomials, and is the lower triangular sub matrix of order , corresponding to last columns of the shifts. , where for ignored constsnts. Since all the computations are done in polynomial time, the modulus can be factored in time polynomial in In a typical instance of small private exponent RSA the public exponent will be roughly the same size as modulus. Using the approximation , we find that a sufficient condition for the attack becomes which is Boneh-Durfee's original result.
EXPERIMENTS
We have done experiment to test our results when and . We used the LLL code from the Victor Shoup's NTL package, which is freely available. The number of bits for public exponent is 1023. The number of bits for private exponent is 254. After applying LLL algorithm by taking lattice parameters m=3, t=1; LLL returns the reduction matrix, in which we apply the resultant methodology for first two vectors, we achieve the polynomial in one variable. For LLL reduction, for above said parameters takes 70 seconds time under Intel core i5 CPU of 2.53GHz. The lattice basis reduction is done using shoup's NTL [18] .
CONCLUSION
By using low private exponent for RSA cryptosystem, one can speed up the decryption process or signatures. But one should take care to use low private exponent, because Boneh-Durfee proved that if low private exponent is less than 0.292, then the system is insecure. It is an open problem of the security of RSA cryptosystem, if private exponent is greater than 0.292, whenever the size of the public exponent is same as modulus size.
